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Abstract
This paper uses a dataset from Tanzania with information on consumption, income, and income
shocks within and across family networks. Crucially and uniquely, it also contains data on the degree
of information existing between each pair of households within family networks. We use these data to
construct a novel measure of the quality of information both at the level of household pairs and at the
level of the network. We also note that the individual level measures can be interpreted as measures of
network centrality. We study risk sharing within these networks and explore whether the rejection of
perfect risk sharing that we observe can be related to our measures of information quality. We show
that households within family networks with better information are less vulnerable to idiosyncratic
shocks. Furthermore, we show that more central households within networks are less vulnerable
to idiosyncratic shocks. These results have important implications for the characterisation of the
empirical failure of the perfect risk-sharing hypothesis and point to the importance of information
frictions. (JEL: D15, D52, D82)
1. Introduction
In many developing countries, risk is very pervasive. The lack of economic
development implies not only that individuals have access to a much lower level
of resources but also that life is much riskier. Substantial shocks to resources, when
one’s living standards are close to subsistence levels, can have important and dramatic
consequences. The presence of risk is particularly salient in rural contexts, where
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individuals are exposed to large and frequent shocks to their livelihoods. Many of
these shocks are idiosyncratic, implying that insurance can be very valuable and
very important. Formal insurance markets, however, rarely exist. Informal insurance
arrangements are common and, according to the available evidence, do provide some
level of insurance (see, for instance Townsend (1994) and, more recently, Kinnan and
Townsend (2012)). The observed allocations, however, are very different from those
that would prevail under perfect risk sharing and complete markets.
Informal insurance in village economies has received considerable attention, both
because it can enable individuals to smooth out idiosyncratic shocks and because its
presence interacts with (and sometimes limits) formal insurance and its development
(see, for instance, Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000) and Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016)).
The presence of perfect risk-sharing arrangements has been rejected in many contexts
(see, for instance, Rosenzweig (1988), Udry (1994) and the recent paper by Kinnan
(2020) and the reference therein). An important and interesting research question is,
therefore, the identification of the imperfections and frictions that prevent perfect risk
sharing. A better understanding of these imperfections and identification of specific
frictions as being particularly salient is important not only from a research point of
view, but also for informing policy reforms and different policy interventions.
The literature has looked at different types of frictions and imperfections, including
the lack of enforceability of informal insurance contracts and imperfect information.1
Information frictions are the focus of this paper. Studies that have looked at them
include Udry (1994), Ligon (1998), Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), and Attanasio and
Pavoni (2011). Information frictions could prevent full risk sharing because of the
difficulty in contracting on specific income shocks and/or to moral hazard behaviour.
In what follows, we relate measures of risk sharing in family networks to measures of
the quality of information in these networks. The type of informational frictions we
consider most closely resemble the local information constraints in Ambrus, Gao, and
Milan (2020). Although we do not map explicitly the imperfections they consider on
specific transfers and consumption data, our paper is among the first to consider an
empirical measure of imperfect information and relate it to risk sharing in a way that
is consistent with the model considered by Ambrus, Gao, and Milan (2020).
Informal insurance arrangements are based on individual transactions and transfers.
Data on these transfers are difficult to collect and in most of the available data sets,
the information on them is very limited and imprecise. The approach proposed by
Townsend (1994) to test for perfect risk sharing is particularly attractive because
it only requires information about consumption allocations (the object that is being
insured) and income or income shocks. Although the approch is silent about the specific
1. Studies that focus on the lack of contract enforceability include Foster and Rosenzweig (2001),
Kocherlakota (1996), Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002), Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000), Albarran and
Attanasio (2003), and, more recently, Ambrus, Mobius, and Szeidl (2014) and Bold and Broer (2018). A
few papers have considered models with both asymmetric information and limited commitment: Atkinson
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mechanisms that are used in practice to implement the observed resource allocations,
it can be useful to characterise the extent to which such allocations differ from perfect
insurance. If such a benchmark arrangement is rejected, one can model deviations from
perfect risk sharing allocations and gain insights on the nature of the imperfections
and frictions that generate the available evidence.
In this paper, we use a unique data set which contains longitudinal data, following
family networks in Tanzania for nearly 20 years. Within each family network, all
individual households are asked about their own wealth (including about ownership
of a variety of different assets) and about the wealth of all other households in their
family network. These rich data provide a unique opportunity to construct measures
of the quality of the information within each family.
The paper makes two original contributions. First, we propose a new methodology
to convert the data on the wealth of each household as perceived by all the other
households in the family network into a measure about the quality of information in
the family network. As we discuss in Section 4, we construct both measures about the
quality of information about each household in the network and about the overall quality
of information in a network. As for the former we obtain measures both of the quality of
the information that the rest of the network has about the wealth of every household and
of the quality of information that each household has about the wealth of the rest of the
network. These concepts are related, as we discuss, to measures of network centrality.
Second, we use the measures of the quality of information we derive to check
whether they are related to deviations from perfect risk sharing. Starting from a
regression similar to those estimated by Townsend (1994), which relates changes
in consumption to idiosycratic shocks after controlling for network level shocks, we
check whether this relationship is affected by the quality of information.
We find that our measures of the quality of information exhibit a substantial
amount of variation across the network and, when considering dyads of households,
the measures covaries with a number of observables (such as the geodesic distance
or the frequency of contact between two households in the famliy network) in the
expected fashion. Given the novelty of the type of measures we use, this result is
important and reassuring.
As for the level of risk sharing, we first document that, as in other contexts, perfect
risk sharing within a network is rejected by our data. When we then look at the way
in which information quality interacts with risk sharing, by and large, we find that
the better the quality of information in a family network (whether measured at the
network or at the individual household level), the closer the allocations in that network
are to those that would occur under perfect risk sharing. The results are more precise
and more convincing when we consider the quality of information at the household
rather than family network level and, in particular, when we consider the quality of the
information that the network has about a household’s wealth. We find that households
whose wealth seems to be better known to the other members of households in the
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result relating so directly risk sharing to
the quality of information.2 We do not directly map the association we find between the
sensitivity of individual consumption changes to idiosyncratic shocks and information
asymmetries to a theoretical model of constrained efficient allocations. This evidence,
however, represents an important step in that direction.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present a conceptual
framework to analyse risk sharing and relate it to information frictions. In Section 3,
we present our data set and in Section 4, we describe our measures of information
quality and report some descriptive statistics on them. We report the results of our
empirical analysis in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Risk Sharing with Imperfect Information: A Conceptual Framework
In this section, we provide a conceptual framework to inform the empirical analysis
that we perform. We take the risk sharing group as a given and characterise risk sharing
within that group. Our definition of risk sharing within a pre-defined group does not
preclude the existence of other risk sharing arrangements or alternative mechanisms to
absorb individual (or group level) shocks. However, the focus is on risk sharing within
the pre-defined group.
The groups we consider in the empirical exercise are family networks. The members
of an original family in 1991 were followed until 2010 as they move out of the initial
nucleus. The survey team was able to achieve a remarkably high response rate: as
discussed in Section 3, attrition was below 10%. It is, therefore, plausible to assume
that membership of a ‘risk sharing group’ as we define it, can be considered as a given
for the period we consider.
We study the ability of a pre-defined risk sharing group members to absorb
indiosyncratic shocks, given the group level shocks. That is, we consider the ability
to share risk within a given group and relate that ability to the quality of information
within that group and, additionally, to some of the properties of the network. Although
it is likely (as we show) that the quality of information within a group is partly a
function of choices made by individual members, this consideration does not affect
the nature of our exercise. We take the quality of information (or the nature of the
network) within a risk sharing group as a given at a point in time and document the
extent to which such a variable affects the ability of individuals to smooth out income
shocks. Our exercise is silent, in the a first instance, about the mechanisms that lead to
a specific relationship between information quality and risk sharing.
2. De Weerdt, Genicot, and Mesnard (2019) use these same data on information within family networks,
but apply a different methodology for constructing a measure of misperceptions in order to study a different
set of questions. They quantify misperceptions by constructing a weighted sum of differences between
believed and actual asset holdings, setting weights according to the correlation of each of the assets with
household consumption. Their focus is on testing alternative motives for transfers within family networks,
which do not include risk-sharing. Indeed as their measure of information imperfections is constructed
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2.1. Perfect Risk Sharing
We start by considering risk sharing within a group of agents. Group membership is
given exogenously and therefore risk sharing groups are defined exogenously. They
could be villages, family networks or other groups.
The approach we take to characterise full risk sharing within a group goes back to
Wilson (1968) and Townsend (1994). We assume that individual j belonging to group
g receives a stochastic endowment yj;gt .
y
j;g
t D Nygt C "jt :
We assume that y is perishable. For expositional simplicity we do not consider
saving here, but it would be straightforward to add that or any other mechanism
to absorb shocks, including risk sharing arrangements with different groups and/or
institutions.
Individual j in group g receives utility from consumption cj;gt , which is given by
their endowment plus a transfer j;gt . The implications for allocations of perfect risk
sharing can be derived considering a social planner problem, as in Townsend (1994),































t D yj;gt C j;gt 8t; j (3)
where t() is a probability measure of the stochastic endowment yj;gt , which reflects
the available (and public) information. yj;gt is completely observable (ex-post) and
can be contracted upon. j, g is the Pareto weight given to individual j in group g,
which allows for inequality and asymmetries within the group and is assumed to be
constant. Different ’s might reflect different status within the risk sharing group, or
access to different amount of resources by different individuals. Again, by modifying
the aggregate resource constraints (2) and/or the individual budget constraint (3), it is
possible to take into account additional insurance mechanisms either through saving
or through risk sharing arrangements outside the group.
Considering the Lagrangian for this problem, in the absence of frictions




t D gt 8i; t: (4)
where gt is the probability of the state of the world at time t and 
g
t is the multiplier








andelshoyskole user on 11 D
ecem
ber 2020
1594 Journal of the European Economic Association
that the right hand side, gt , does not depend on the individual household index i.
Second, the Pareto weight i, g is a constant that does not depend on t. Finally, the
f.o.c. is not averaged across different states of the world, but holds, appropriately
weighted by gt ./, the probability distribution of the income shocks, for every possible
state. This last fact is key to the perfect risk sharing structure. As income shocks are
fully observable and contractable upon, insurance contracts can diversity idiosyncratic
income shocks, regardless of the properties of the stochastic process that generates





I 8i; t (5)
Taking logs of equation (4) one gets:
ln.i;g/ C ln.u0.ci;gt // C t ln.ˇ/ D ln.gt / (6)
This equation can be taken to data in several ways. One can introduce and estimate
individual fixed effects to capture the unobservable Pareto weights, or one can can take
time differences to difference them out. Having many risk sharing groups, one has to
consider timeXgroup fixed effects.
Taking differences across time periods:
s ln.u
0.ci;gt // C s ln.ˇ/ D s ln.gt / (7)
Equations (6) and (7) capture the essence of perfect risk sharing. We notice the
absence from the right hand side of any time varying idiosyncratic variable, once one
controls for a group aggregate. In equation (6), which is expressed in levels, one has
to control for individual fixed effects that capture the Pareto weights of the planner
problem. These effects drop out once one considers the expression in different time
periods and takes the difference between them. We notice that expresson in equation
(7) is not necessarily in first differences, that is the changes in (log) consumption
considered are not over a specific period. One consider changes to difference out the
Pareto weights fixed effects.
The restrictions in equations (6) and (7) are the key implications of perfect risk
sharing. To test them, Townsend (1994) and others have augmented it with idiosyncratic
variables, such as levels or changes of individual income.
ln.u0.ci;gt // D Qi;g C ln.gt / C Q ln.yi;gt / C Q"i;gt (8)
s ln.u
0.ci;gt // D g C s ln.gt / C s ln.yi;gt / C "i;gt (9)
where Q"i;gt and "i;gt reflect measurement error and other unobservables. The coefficients
Q and  , which measure the vulnerability of a single individual to idiosyncratic shocks,
should be 0 under perfect risk sharing.
An attractive feature of this approach is that it is based exclusively on consumption
and idiosyncratic resource information. It does not require information about the
decentralization mechanisms (such as transfers) that a given realisation of income
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2.2. Deviations from Perfect Risk Sharing: Imperfect Information
Empirically, perfect risk sharing is often rejected. Researchers have found that,
although some smoothing of idiosyncratic shocks is observed, observed allocations are
different from first best ones, in that consumption is affected by idiosyncratic shocks.
Although individuals in a variety of contexts can achieve some insurance, the empirical
evidence seems to reject perfect risk sharing (see Rosenzweig (1988), Udry (1994)
and Kinnan (2020)). De Weerdt and Hirvonen (2016) find similar evidence in the same
data we use in what follows, which were collected in Tanzania.
As discussed in the introduction, in light of the rejection of perfect risk sharing,
a profitable approach is to look at the relevance of specific frictions. In this paper,
we analyse a very simple and specific information problem. In particular, we relate
the level of risk sharing (or deviations from perfect risk sharing) to the quality of
information in a given network. We start by assuming that individual household i in
risk sharing group g (a family network), receives an exogenous income yi, g. Each




t D yi;gt C eij;g (10)
where xij;gt is the signal received by household j about household i’s income, where
both households belong to group g. eij;g is a zero-mean random variable, which
represents the noise that somewhat masks household i’s income from household j. The
variance of this noise represents the quality of information that household j has about
household i. We will allow the precision of the signal to be different across different
members of the network and, as we discuss in what follows, construct estimates of the
quality of the information each individual household in any given pair in a network
has about the other. The quality of the information that different network members
have about the economic status of any given individual household effectively defines
the position of that household in the network.
In our empirical application, we follow two different approaches, which we discuss
in the next sub-section. First, we assume that the extent of risk sharing within a pre-
defined group (in our case a family network) is determined by the quality of information
available in a network. Family networks where the information is of high quality, will
be closer to the first best allocations that would be observed under perfect risk sharing.
Individuals living in households that are part of family networks where information
flows are of inferior quality, on the other hand, will be more vulnerable to idiosyncratic
shocks that could be diversified.
Second, we relate household vulnerability to the position of the household in a
family network, which in turn is determined by the quality of information in the
network. This approach can be interpreted in the light of a model of bilateral transfers
among all the households in the networks. In such a model, discussed by Attanasio
et al. (2020, in progress), the net transfers between households i and j are determined
by contracts based on the information common to these households, which is xij;gt
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explicit incentive compatibility constraints induced by truth telling contraints or moral
hazard problems. Instead, it uses a static framework where transfers between pairs of
households can only be conditional on the information available to both members. We
now turn to the discussion of these two approaches.
2.3. Empirical Strategy to Measure the Effect of Asymmetric Information
One of the advantages of the perfect risk-sharing model is that one can be agnostic
about the specific decentralization of the efficient allocation. One, therefore, does not
need to keep track of all bilateral transfers and can consider only net transfers, and
therefore consumption allocations, of each individual. This is not necessarily the case
in the asymmetric information case with several sources of asymmetries. It is possible,
however, to implement tests that identify violation of perfect risk sharing by looking at
the vulnerability of individual consumption to idiosyncratic shocks and relating such
vulnerability to the quality of information in a given risk-sharing group.
To capture deviations from perfect risk sharing due to imperfect information
empirically we extend equation (9) in several ways. First, we estimate the following
equation:3
s ln.u
0.cj;gt // D  C gt C '1Iqg C .0 C 1Iqg/s ln.yj;gt / C "j;gt (11)
where Iqg is a measure of the quality of information in family network g and

g
t D s ln.gt /. Because Iqg varies only across networks, the parameter '1 cannot
be identified as the variation in Iqg would be absorbed by the group dummies gt .
The coefficient  in equation (9) should equal to zero under perfect risk sharing,
as idiosyncratic shocks and changes to household income should not be related to
changes in household consumption, after controlling for group level shocks, which is
what the group-time dummies gt do.
4 Such a coefficient can therefore be intepreted
as the “excess” sensitivity of individual consumption changes to idiosyncratic shocks.
In equation (11), we let this coefficient be a function of the quality of information in
a risk sharing group. If 1 has the opposite sign of 0, vulnerability in high quality
information networks is lower. Allocations in such networks are closer to those that
would prevail under perfect risk sharing. Although such evidence would stress the
importance of information frictions in shaping risk sharing arrangements, it does not
follow directly from a theoretical model that maps these friction on onto consumption
allocations.
3. We also estimate similar versions of equation (8), which is in levels. These equations have a very large
number of parameters, as we need individual fixed effect and we have a small number of periods. The
results are similar and are available upon request.
4. In our data, where we have two periods, and therefore, one period over which changes in consumption
are observed, we only have group dummies. It is important, however, to remember that if additional time
periods were available, we would have fully interacted time and group dummies, to reflect the resource
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The estimation of equation (11) requires a measure of the quality of information
within a network. We discuss such a measure in Section 4 in what follows. The
main idea here is that, family networks where information is very good are close to
achieving perfect risk sharing, although family networks where information is very
imperfect, deviate considerably from perfect risk sharing, so that individual households
are vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks.
In equation (11), the quality of information varies across family networks but it
is constant for the households within a family network. In the model presented by
Ambrus, Gao, and Milan (2020) and developed by Attanasio et al. (2020, in progress),
under a certain set of assumptions, vulnerability of an individual does not depend
exclusively on the average quality of the information flows in that network, but could
depend on the position of a given individual in the network and an appropriate weighted
average of the shocks received in the network. To bring this intuition to the data, in
addition to equation (11), we also estimate the following equation:
s ln.u
0.cj;gt // D g C gt C '2NPi;g C .0 C 2NPi;g/s ln.yj;gt / C "j;gt (12)
where NPi,g is a measure of household centrality within the family network, reflecting
either average quality of the information about household i’s income held by the
other members of the family network, or quality of information that household i
has about incomes of the other households in the network. We discuss the definition
and interpretation of these alternative variables in Section 4, where we discuss the
construction of information quality measures. As before, in addition to interacting
NPi,g with individual shocks, we also enter that variable on its own.
Implementing the estimation of equations (11) and (12) requires the availability of
variables that can capture the quality of information and the position in the risk sharing
network of an individual. We discuss these issues in what follows. Before moving
to the description of the data and to the methods we use to obtain these measures,
it is worth mentioning a few additional issues. First, we notice that both the Iqg and
NPi,g variables do not have a time subscript as we assume they are constant over time.
This assumption is forced on us in part by the fact that we have measurements on
the quality of information only in the last wave of the survey. We can justify this
assumption, however, by pointing to the fact that we only consider two time periods.
We can therefore argue that our measure of information quality captures the household
vulnerability to idiosyncratic shocks that occur between those two periods.
A more worrying possible criticism is that the quality of information and the
structure of the networks does not change randomly, but might be linked to individual
incentives and economic opportunities. As we will see in what follows, much of the
variation in household information quality is driven by distance between geographic
locations, which is in turn driven by migration decisions. Although migration
decisions are very likely to be driven by economic opportunities, we stress that our
characterization of risk sharing, based on measuring how household vulnerability is
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Considering, for instance, equation (11), we notice that the left-hand side represents
changes in the log of the marginal utility for household i belonging to group g.
The residual term of that equation, "i;gt represents measurement error and other
unobservable shifts to the marginal utility of consumption. One possible source of bias
in the results we obtain would be a correlation between the unobserved determinants
of log marginal utility across networks and differences in the quality of information.
Reassuringly, however, our results do not change when we add variables, such as
changes in family composition, that might capture part of the variability of "i;gt ,
suggesting that they are unlikely to be affected by this type of omitted variable bias.
Of course, it could be that idiosyncratic changes in the marginal utility of consumption
could induce migration of some network members and, as a consequence, be correlated
with the quality of information. We take the information structure in an extended family
network (and its drivers) as given and predetermined at the start of the period over
which we consider consumption changes.
3. The Data from Tanzania
The Kagera Health and Development Survey (KHDS) in Tanzania is one of the longest
running African panel surveys designed to study long-run and inter-generational
trends in and mechanisms of poverty persistence and economic growth in rural
households. Kagera region lies at the shores of Lake Victoria and shares a border with
Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. The 2012 census estimated a population of just under
2.5 million. More than 80% of the households rely on agricultural production as their
main source of income (NBS 2013). The first round of KHDS interviews was held in
1991–1994 with 915 households originating from 51 villages and urban areas across
Kagera interviewed up to four times. The first follow-up survey was organized in
2004 with the aim of re-interviewing all individuals ever interviewed at the baseline
(1991–1994). This involved tracking individuals who had migrated away from the
village to other parts of the region, elsewhere in Tanzania or to neighboring Uganda.
More than 93% of the baseline households were re-contacted after a 10-year period
(see Beegle et al. 2006).5 The second follow-up survey was organized in 2010. This
time the tracking success rate was 92%; that is at least one original household member
was interviewed for 92% of baseline households (see DeWeerdt et al. 2012). Relative
to comparable panel surveys, these household level attrition rates are exceptionally
low (Alderman et al. 2001).
At the individual level, the re-interview rates among survivors were 82% in 2004
and 85% in 2010. The aim in the 2004 and 2010 survey rounds was to re-interview
all of the surviving individuals who were on at least one of the 1991–1994 household
rosters. In total, there were 6,353 individuals on these; by 2010, 1,275 of these had
died whereas 85% of the surviving 4,996 individuals were re-interviewed.
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TABLE 1. Sample characteristics.
Mean SD
Location of household
Regional capital/city 0.19 0.39
District capital/peri-urban town 0.12 0.33
Well-connected village 0.54 0.50
Remote village 0.15 0.36
Main source of household income
Non-agricultural wage employment 0.16 0.37




2004 consumption per capita (in 2010 TZS) 444,680.83 390770.05
2010 consumption per capita (in 2010 TZS) 702,459.58 745049.09
Household composition
Head is male 0.79 0.41
Head age 41.56 15.48
Head education 6.18 3.22
Highest level of education in hh 7.42 2.72
Household size 4.64 2.39
Male age 0 to 15 0.45 0.50
Female age 0 to 15 0.48 0.50
Male age 6 to 60 1.06 0.74
Female age 6 to 60 1.12 0.75
Male age 61C 0.08 0.27
Female age 61C 0.12 0.34
Observations 2,780
At each round of the survey a complete multi-topic household questionnaire was
administered to all split-off households containing individuals who had resided in
the original baseline sample of households. Topics covered ranged from education,
health, employment and migration of individual household members, to household
asset ownership, consumption expenditure, formal and informal networks, remittances,
history of economic shocks, and more (see DeWeerdt et al. 2012 for a detailed
description).
We now present some basic sample descriptive statistics and discuss the key
features which make these data uniquely suitable for our analysis.
3.1. Sample Characteristics
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for the sample. We focus here on the sample
we will use in the main analysis which excludes some households (we discuss which
ones in what follows). In total we focus on 2,780 households formed from 709 original
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nearly 70% in well connected or remote villages. About half relied on agriculture as
the main source of household income. The great majority of households (79%) have a
male head who, on average has around 6 years of schooling (equivalent to completing
primary school). Even focusing on individuals with the highest level of education in
the household, we see that this is equivalent to incomplete lower secondary schooling.
The main outcome in our analysis is consumption growth between 2004 and
2010; which seems quite substantial over that period. On average, in 2010, per-capita
consumption is measured to be nearly 60% higher than that in 2004. Growth in non-
food consumption has significantly exceeded that in food consumption, at 97% and
39% respectively. This increase is likely to be driven by several factors, including
ageing and family changes, as well as aggregate growth. It is clear from the data that
migration plays an important role; although per-capita consumption grew at half of
the average rate (by 32%) among those who stayed in the original baseline villages,
it more than doubled among those who moved outside the region. This difference is
highlighted in other studies using these data (see Beegle et al. 2006 and De Weerdt
and Hirvonen 2016).
3.2. Household Consumption Expenditure and Shocks
We now turn to the key variables in the analysis set out in Section 2.3, including
consumption expenditure and household income. Detailed consumption expenditure
data were collected in each round of the survey. We utilise consumption expenditure
data collected in the 2004 and 2010 rounds. The questionnaires included modules
capturing food and non-food consumption, with differing recall periods to reflect
seasonality of consumption of certain items and several checks built in to accurately
capture consumption from home-production. The surveys also included price
questionnaires which were used to generate temporal and spatial deflators for the
consumption expenditure aggregates (DeWeerdt et al. 2012).
Unfortunately, our data do not include detailed information on household income
for the last (2010) survey wave. It is, therefore, not possible to run equations (11)–
(12) as specified. Instead of income, however, we have information about the shocks,
positive and negative, these households recall experiencing in each year between 2004
and 2010, collected in 2010. Specifically, for each year between 2004 and 2010 all
individuals who had been members of the original households in 1991–1994 were
asked to report whether it was a very good, good, average, bad, or very bad year. For
very good and very bad years they were further asked to give reasons and for very bad
years ways in which they coped.
The top panel of Table 2 shows that only a fifth of households did not report
experiencing a bad or very bad shock in any of the years between 2004 and 2010.
Households reported experiencing a bad shock in an average of 2.5 years over this
period. Good shocks and very good shocks are less prevalent, though still nearly
two-thirds of the households report experiencing at least one during the recall period.
To give some idea of what the key risks for families in this context are, the middle
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TABLE 2. Shocks, their causes and consequences.
Mean SD
Shock prevalence
Any bad or very bad shock between 2004 and 2010 0.80 0.40
Any good or very good shock between 2004 and 2010 0.65 0.48
Years with bad/very bad shocks between 2004 and 2010 2.57 2.11
Years with good/very good shocks between 2004 and 2010 2.27 2.30
Any bad or very bad shock in 2010 0.35 0.48
Any good or very good shock in 2010 0.33 0.47
N 3,313
Shock cause (2004–2010)
Failed harvest 0.32 0.47
Loss of employment 0.12 0.32
Family illness/death 0.38 0.49




Reduced consumption 0.29 0.46
Sold Assets 0.18 0.39
Took on more work 0.25 0.43
Diversified (business/crops) 0.11 0.31
Support from formal/informal orgs 0.03 0.16
Relied on family and friends 0.39 0.49
Migrated for work 0.03 0.17
Other 0.16 0.36
N 1,627
had a very bad year at least once during the recall period. Most commonly cited reasons
include family illness and death, as well as poor harvest. The bottom panel of the table
suggests that family and friends are an important source of support during these hard
times; two out of five individuals who report experiencing a very bad shock during the
recall period said that they relied on family and friends as the main coping strategy.
Other most commonly cited strategies include reducing consumption and taking on
more work. In this paper we focus on shocks reported for 2010, the year immediately
preceding the survey. The table shows that 35% of households reported experiencing
a bad or very bad shock in that period, and nearly the same proportion (33%) a good
or very good one.
In the third panel of Table 2, we report information on the main coping strategies
individual households use to deal with the negative shocks they received. We notice
that the most common coping mechanisms, used by nearly 40% of the households,
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TABLE 3. KHDS 2010 sample location.
Location of original Family networks in 2010
household members in 2010 with at least one individual in:
Same village as in baseline 0.52 0.86
Nearby village 0.09 0.31
Same region as in baseline 0.23 0.60
Another region in Tanzania 0.14 0.36
Another country 0.01 0.04
Observations 4,287 816
is a reduction in consumption, which is relevant for nearly 30% of the households,
followed by an increase in labor supply (25%) and dis-saving (18%).
3.3. Family Networks
A key feature of the data that makes our analysis possible is availability of information
on a relatively large number of “family networks.” We define a family network as the
group of households formed by individuals who were living in a single household at
the beginning of the data collection and that have subsequently split-off into different
households, for a variety of reasons, including marriage and migration. Some of these
split-off households are located in the same village as the original nucleus, others are
in near-by villages, and others still live in relatively far away places. Our data include
a large sample of such networks; although the original 1991–1994 sample consisted
of 915 households, the 2010 sample contains members from 816 of these residing
across 3,313 households. That is, on average each of the original households had split
into just over four households. Consistently with this Table 3 shows that by 2010 only
about half of the original members of the 1991–1994 households were still living in
the original village; about a third moved out of the villages but remained in the region
and 15% had left the region either relocationg to another part of Tanzania or leaving
the country.
Column 2 in Table 3 shows proportions of original households (or family networks)
that had at least one member residing in each of the listed locations. This presents
a somewhat different picture. Although about half of the original 4,287 household
members who were re-surveyd in 2010 had moved to a different location, the great
majority (86%) of the networks still had at least one member residing in the original
village in 2010. Similarly, although only 15% of the individuals had moved out of the
region by 2010, they came from 40% of the family networks. Maps in Appendix A show
changes in the spatial distribution of the households between 1991–1994 and 2010.
4. Information Quality
In the 2010 (last) data-collection round of the KHDS, a big effort was made to capture
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possess about each other’s standard of living. This is the information that makes this
data-set uniquely suited for our purposes.
4.1. Measuring Information Quality
Specifically, in the 2010 round each household within a family network was asked
a series of questions about each of the other households in the family network. The
information collected includes how often each pair interact and in what way, history
of recent monetary and in-kind transfers and, critically for us, their beliefs about asset
ownership among the other households in the network. The asset list includes house,
land, livestock, phone, television, and motorized vehicle. Each household was asked
about whether they themselves owned these assets and whether they believed that each
of the other households did. For each dyad within the network, then, these data provide
information on the “truth” (self-reported asset ownership for each household in the
network) and the “beliefs” regarding all other households in the network. In this set-up,
the quality of information that household i has about household j can differ from the
information that household j has about household i. A limitation of the data is that
original household members who were still living in the original baseline village in
2010 were not asked about each other even if they were living in diffierent households
so we have to assume that they have perfect information about each other.
In the exercise we perform, we need to construct statistics that represent the quality
of information between the nodes of the family network. In total once we exclude
households with no split offs and households for which we have no 2004 data, or
are missing data for key variables we have a sample of 709 family networks, 2,780
households and 12,693 dyads (descriptive statistics for these households are presented
in Table 1).
In order to use these data to construct a measure of information quality within a
family network (and the quality of the information about a generic individual wealth),
we assume that there is a latent variable 	ji;g , which represents the wealth or well being
of household i as perceived by household j; where both households i and j belong to
family g. Note that 	 ii;g represents the “true” latent variable for household i. Although
we do not have direct information about either the “true” wealth of household i or
how this wealth is perceived by household j, we have answers to questions about
households i owning a number of assets given by all the households in the family to
which i belongs, including i themself. We denote with Ak;ji;g a variable that indicates
whether household j thinks that household i of family g owns asset k. Ak;ii;g indicates
whether household i actually owns asset k.
Before delving into the description of the methodology we use to synthetize the
information different households have of the wealth held by other member of the
family network, we present some evidence about the correctness of the information
about individual assets. In Table 4, we notice that a relative high proportion of answers
about individual assets are “correct,” in the sense that they coincide with the answer
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TABLE 4. Quality of information: descriptives.
Mean SD








Proportion of all assets reported correctly 0.78 0.29
All assets reported correctly 0.46 0.50
N 12,693
answers is close to 80%. However, less than half the dyads report correct answer for
all assets. Therefore, we conclude that the information in the family networks in our
sample is far from perfect.
To summarize the answers that individual dyads of households give about each
other asset ownerships into a single index reflecting the quality of information about
that dyad, we assume that, although the latent index 	ji;g is unobservable by the
researcher, the information about asset ownership is related to such a latent variable
by an Item Response Theory (IRT) model. In particular, we assume that the standard
of living latent variable 	ji;g determines the probability that household i owns asset k
according to a 1-parameter Rasch model:6




1 C eˇkC ii;g
	 ii;g  N .0; 
2/ (13)
When information is available about at least two assets, it is possible to estimate the
parameters of the measurement system in equation (13). Given the estimates of the
relevant paramters, it is possible to obtain, from a set of measures Ak;ii;g , an estimate
of the unobservable household wealth 	 ii;g , which we denote by
O	 ii;g . The parameters
of this model and the answers provided by household j about household i’s assets can
be also used to get an estimate of 	ji;g ,
O	ji;g . The model in equation (13) effectively
summarizes the information about asset ownership in a single index. Analogously,
the same model can be used to summarize the answers provided by household j
on household i so to obtain O	ji;g . The implicit assumption is that the latent factor
representing j’s perception about i’s wealth can be represented by a model like the
one in equation (13). Or, in other words, that household j’s answers to questions about
various items owned by household i are driven by the sample factor that drives the
answers by their own wealth.
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FIGURE 1. Kdensity of “true” & “perceived” living standard 	 .
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the true and the perceived living standard
estimates from the IRT model. The fact that the two are not perfectly overlapping
suggests that households in the network are not perfectly informed about each-other’s
living standards.
4.2. Constructing Measures of Information Quality
We then take assume the difference between O	ji;g and O	 ii;g as reflecting the quality of
information about income flows and shocks of the network members. We note that
the model in equation (13) assumes that the latent factor 	 ii;g is normally distributed.
This might not be the best representation of the variability of economic well-being
within a network. We therefore consider three alternative measures that capture the
different between i’s “true well-being” and the perception of the same factor as held by
household j. In particular, we define three different measures to capture such difference,
which we label qg;`i;j ; ` D 1; 2; 3:
q
g;1














The first measure takes the estimates of the latent factor 	 i, g straight from the Rasch
model in equation (13). The second measure considers the exponents of the latent factor
estimated with the Rasch model, implicitly assuming that the factor being modeled in
equation (13) is the log of the factor of interest. In this case, therefore, we express the
distance between the actual and perceived status in term of the levels of this variable,
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TABLE 5. Quality of information and observables.
Mean SD
Quality of information by distance between households
Q1 (0.4 km) 0.97 0.11
Q2 (4.2 km) 0.81 0.23
Q3 (17.2 km) 0.75 0.24
Q4 (81.6 km) 0.70 0.25
Q5 (613.5 km) 0.67 0.24
Quality of information by last time households spoke
Less Than A Month Ago 0.86 0.21
Less Than A Year Ago 0.74 0.23
Less Than 2 Years Ago 0.71 0.25
Less Than 5 Years Ago 0.66 0.25
More Than 5 Years Ago 0.64 0.26
Don’t Remember 0.59 0.26
N 12,693
the middle of the first two. Given these definitions of the distance between the true
and perceived well-being status, we construct an index that varies between 0 and 1. In










When qg;`i;j is zero, that is the information j has about i is perfectly accurate,
˛
g;`
i;j D 1. Vice-versa, when the same information is very inaccurate, ˛g;`i;j tends to
zero.
Taking the simplest of these measures (˛g;1ij ), we now analyse how our measure
of the quality of information between two households are related to a series of
characteristics that we would expect it to be related to. Most obviously, households that
are located closer together and those that interact more should have better information
about eachother. Table 5 shows that this is indeed the case—the degree of misperception
is highly positively correlated with physical distance as well as with frequency of
contact. For households living close to each other (bottom quintile of geodesic distance
from each other in which households are on average 400 meters apart), our measure
is closed to perfect at 0.97.8 However, already for households at the median distance
from each other (17.2 kms), the average index is 0.75. The same index declines to 0.67
for the households living in top quintile of distance from each other.
7. We multiply the third measure by two so that it varies between zero and one.
8. This is mostly mechanical as we assume perfect information for all households within a family
network still located in the baseline village, because data on how much they know about each other were
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A similar pattern is observed if we consider how our index varies with the frequency
of contact. For households that have spoken to each other less than a month before the
interview, the average index is 0.86. This declines with frequency: for households that
have not spoken for more than 5 years the index is 0.64.




i;j ; ` D 1; 2; 3

for each dyad in the network,
we can organise them into a matrix Ag;` D ˛g;`i;j , for each family network in our
data, where we set ˛g;`i;i D 0; 8i . The matrices Ag,` so constructed are weighted
adjacency matrices. We note that, unlike many of these matrices used in the literature,
their elements are not binary, as they can take continuous values between 0 and 1.
Furthermore, these matrices can be asymmetric, as the quality of information that
household i has about household j might be different from the quality of information
that j has about i.
Given an adjacency matrix Ag,`, for each household in family g, we can now
construct measures of their position in the network. In our empirical application, we
will use measures of degree centrality, which can be obtained summing or averaging,
for each household, the elements of the row or the columns of the adjacency matrix
corresponding to that household. As the matrices we are considering is not symmetric,
the measures obtained averaging the rows or the columns are different. Averaging over










where Kg is the number of households in family g. The expression in equation (16)
is the in-degree centrality derived from the adjacency matrix Ag,` and represents the
average quality of the information the network has about the wealth of household
i. Analogously, we can construct the out-degree centrality measure for household i
averaging the elements of the matrix Ag,` corresponding to column i. This measure



















We notice that the expression in equation (18) can be constructed either from
equation (16) or equation (17).
In Figures 2, for each of our information quality measures, we plot the density
distribution of the in-degree and out-degree centrality in our sample of individual
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FIGURE 2. Kdensity of InQh;`i and OutQ
h;`
i .
TABLE 6. Summary statistics and correlation matrix: network centrality measures.












InQh;1i 0.79 0.17 1.000
InQh;2i 0.77 0.20 0.944 1.000
InQh;3i 0.81 0.18 0.983 0.929 1.000
OutQh;1i 0.78 0.16 0.318 0.313 0.303 1.000
OutQh;2i 0.77 0.18 0.316 0.322 0.303 0.956 1.000
OutQh;3i 0.80 0.16 0.305 0.301 0.294 0.983 0.943 1.000
N 2,780
Family network
IQh, 1 0.79 0.13
IQh, 2 0.77 0.15
IQh, 3 0.80 0.13
N 709
distributed in a reasonably similar fashion, which spans a large set of values. The
mode of the three distributions is above 0.80. The three distributions seem to be
left-skewed.
Table 6 shows the means and standard deviations of the various degree centrality
measures considered, both at the family network and the household levels; for the
household level measures we also include the matrix of correlation coefficients. At the
family network level, mean degree centrality across the three measures is around 0.8;
it is lowest for the second measure at 0.7. A similar picture emerges, not surprisingly,
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in-degree and out-degree centrality vary similarly in our sample with a correlation
coefficient which is above 0.9. We notice, however, that, for each of the three measures,
the correlation between in- and out- degree centrality is much lower, at around 0.3. In
our sample there seems to a considerable level of asymmetry in the adjacency matrices
we construct with our measures of information quality.
5. Risk Sharing and the Quality of Information within Family Networks
Following the empirical strategy set out in Section 2.3, to measure the extent of risk
sharing and deviations from first best allocations, similarly to Townsend (1994), we
relate changes in individual consumption to idiosyncratic shocks; under perfect risk
sharing, after controlling for risk-sharing group  time effects, these shocks should be
diversified. In particular, we estimate the following regression:
s ln.u
0.cjgt // D gt C 1BSjgt C 2GSjgt C C"jgt (19)
where s ln.u
0.cjgt // is the change in consumption for individual household j in family
network g, and GSjgt and BS
jg
t are indicators for good and bad shocks received by
that household and gt reflect family network level resources and shocks at time t.
These shocks might be in part attenuated by risk sharing mechanisms (such as saving
or interactions with other groups) that we do not consider explicitly. The gt ’s are
estimated as coefficients on group  time dummy variables. As discussed previously,
the definition of the group g is taken as given in our framework. g can represent villages
or family networks or another predetermined group. In our exercise we consider risk
sharing within family networks.
Unlike Townsend (1994), given the available information in our data, we do not use
individual income to test for perfect risk sharing. Instead, we use the information on
individual shocks of various nature, which we have discussed in Section 3.2. We also
note that the changes in (log) consumption are not across adjacent time periods because
data on these are not available: we use the difference across available time-periods in
the analysis nevertheless to eliminate from the equation taken to the data the Pareto
weights from the social planner problem. In the presence of perfect risk-sharing we
would expect the coefficients 1 and 2 in equation (19), after controlling for group
level shocks, represented by the group  time ht dummies, to be zero.
This is not what we find: The results in the first column of Table 7 show that the
coefficients on the bad shock indicators (1) are statistically significant and negative, so
that experiencing a bad or very bad shock in 2010 is related to a decrease in individual
household consumption between 2004 and 2010. On the other hand, the coefficient on
the ‘good shock’ is very small and, although positive, not significantly different from
zero.
This evidence represents a rejection of perfect risk sharing in that idiosyncratic
shocks are not fully diversified within the family network and is consistent with findings
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TABLE 7. Sensitivity of risk-sharing to quality of information within family network.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inf. quality measure none IQh, 1 IQh, 2 IQh, 3
Bad shock in 2010  0.134  0.420  0.324  0.324
(0.035) (0.256) (0.223) (0.223)
Good shock in 2010 0.00289 0.679 0.561 0.561
(0.036) (0.262) (0.227) (0.227)
Good shock  mean degree cent IQh, `  0.863  0.729  0.729
(0.332) (0.293) (0.293)
Bad shock  mean degree cent IQh, ` 0.365 0.248 0.248
(0.324) (0.287) (0.287)
Constant 0.434 0.434 0.434 0.434
(0.0125) (0.0240) (0.0241) (0.0241)
Observations 2,780 2,780 2,780 2,780
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
Dep var D change in lnpcconsumption between 2004 and 2010 (2010 prices); Family network FE
Shock D 1 if reported by anyone in household
 p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01.
paper is to relate these deviations from perfect risk sharing to imperfect information.
As a first step in that direction, we interact the income shock variables with measures
that reflect the quality of information in the network. Following the approach suggested
in equation (11), we estimate the following regression:
s ln.u
0.cj;gt // D gt C .01 C 11IQg;`/BSj;gt C .02 C 12IQg;`/GSj;gt C "j;gt
(20)
where we interact good and bad idiosyncratic shocks with the information quality in the
family network g, using the three different versions of IQg,` derived in equation (18).
As we discuss in Section 4, IQg,` is close to zero in family network with information
of very poor quality and is 1 when information about asset ownership is perfect. We
report the results in columns (2) to (4) of Table 7.
Given the specification in equation (20), the coefficients on the good and bad
shocks now represent how household consumption is affected by those idiosyncratic
shocks in networks with very low levels of information quality. On the other hand,
the impact of bad and good shocks in networks with perfect information quality is
obtained summing by summing the coefficients in rows (2) and (3) for the good shocks
and in rows (1) and (4) for the bad shocks.
Starting with the coefficient on the good shocks, which in column (1) is effectively
0, we notice that it becomes positive and strongly significant in columns (3) an (4) for
networks with very poor information quality. On the other hand, in networks with very
good information quality, the coefficient is close to be zero. These results hold for all
three definitions of information quality that we use.
Moving now to the negative shocks, for which the coefficient in column (1) is 0.13
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TABLE 8. Sensitivity of risk-sharing to quality of information other households in a family network
have about household.
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Bad shock in 2010  0.134  0.457  0.426  0.419
(0.0350) (0.164) (0.146) (0.164)
Good shock in 2010 0.00289 0.428 0.279 0.417
(0.0363) (0.166) (0.144) (0.166)
HH indegree cent InQh;`i  0.337  0.252  0.327
(0.152) (0.139) (0.148)
Good shock  HH indegree cent InQh;`i  0.535  0.360  0.511
(0.206) (0.182) (0.202)
Bad shock  HH indegree cent InQh;`i 0.413 0.379 0.357
(0.203) (0.184) (0.199)
Constant 0.434 0.697 0.627 0.695
(0.0241) (0.121) (0.109) (0.121)
Observations 2,780 2,780 2,780 2,780
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
Dep var D change in lnpcconsumption between 2004 and 2010 (2010 prices); Family network FE
Shock D 1 if reported by anyone in the household
 p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01.
coefficient is larger in absolute value. Moreover, the coefficient on the interactions is
of the opposite sign (row (4)) so that the sum of these cofficients and those in the first
row is close to zero. These estimates, however, are not very precise, so that all these
coefficients are not significantly different from zero. These results are also very similar
across the three different measures of information quality.
We conclude that the evidence in Table 7 constitutes suggestive evidence that the
quality of information affects the amount of risk sharing that we observe in family
networks. The evidence is particularly convincing for positive shocks, although the
point estimates for negative shocks offer a similar story, albeit with low precision.
Having considered the quality of information in a network we now move to
considering how the sensitivity of household consumption to idiosyncratic shocks is
affected by their position in the family network, as measured by the network centrality
measures we have considered. In particular, we estimate the following equation:
s ln.u
0.cj;gt // D gt C .01 C 21IP g;`i /BSj;gt C .02 C 22IP g;`i /GSj;gt C "j;gt
(21)
where IP g;`i is either the in-degree centrality InQ
h;`
i as computed in equation (16) or
the out-degree centrality measure as constructed in equation (17). As previously, we
compute these statistics for each of the adjaciency matrices we derived. The first set
of results, which we report in Table 8, measures how the quality of information about
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TABLE 9. Sensitivity of risk-sharing to quality of information household has about other households
in the family network.
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Bad shock in 2010  0.134  0.139  0.126  0.0997
(0.0350) (0.185) (0.160) (0.186)
Good shock in 2010 0.00289 0.116 0.0852 0.162
(0.0363) (0.191) (0.165) (0.195)
HH outdegree cent OutQh;`i 0.124 0.0523 0.195
(0.183) (0.161) (0.180)
Good shock  HH outdegree cent OutQh;`i  0.144  0.107  0.200
(0.239) (0.209) (0.238)
Bad shock  HH outdegree cent OutQh;`i 0.00741  0.0104  0.0424
(0.233) (0.204) (0.230)
Constant 0.434 0.336 0.393 0.278
(0.0241) (0.146) (0.126) (0.146)
Observations 2,780 2,780 2,780 2,780
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
Dep var D change in lnpcconsumption between 2004 and 2010 (2010 prices); Family network FE
Shock D 1 if reported by anyone in the household
 p < 0.10,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01.
the sensitivity of its consumption to shocks, whereas the second, reported in Table 9,
measures how the quality of information household i has about the situations of other
households in the network affects its sensitivity to its own shocks.
The first column of Table 8 is reproduced from the same column in Table 7. When
in columns (2)–(4) we add the measures of in-degree centrality, the results change
substantially, especially for the second measure (column (3)). First, we notice that
the in-degree centrality measures themselves are significant. Households that are more
central experience, on average, lower levels of consumption growth. More importantly,
the coefficients on both the negative and positive shocks increase in size and are
both statistically significantly different from zero. These coefficients are relevant for
households that have very low levels of in-degree centrality, that is households for
which the information that other households in the network have is very poor. This
result is particularly evident for the second and third measures that we use. Households
about whom the network has better information experience consumption growth that
is less volatile than average although, at the same time, experiencing lower growth. It
is as if these household compensate for the reduced variability with lower cosumption
growth.
When we look at the interactions of the in-degree centrality with the shocks,
we notice that both interactions are significantly different from zero and attract a
coefficient which is opposite in sign to the coefficients on the shocks. For instance,
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situation is well known to other households in the network so that it has an in-degree
centrality of 1, the effect of a bad shock is given by 0.047 D 0.379  0.426, which is
not statistically different from zero. Analogously, for the same households a positive
shock attracts a coefficient of 0.081 D 0.279  0.36. Similar results hold for the third
measure.
After the in-degree centrality, we also look at whether out-degree centrality
play a role. That is we investigate whether the quality of information that each
household i has about the economic status of the rest of the family network
affects the relationship between consumption changes and idiosyncratic shocks. With
this objective, we re-estimate equation (21) using as the IP g;`i variable the out-
degree centrality measures constructed in equation (17). We report the results in
Table 9.
In this case, the information quality variable does not seem to play any role. None
of the terms involving such a variable are stastically significant and, as the results
become much nosier, no clear patterns emerge. We conclude that out-degree centrality
does not play any role in the amount of risk sharing we observe in our sample.
Overall, these results suggest that the level of information within a network
matters. It also matters, however, what information we consider. The results in
Table 7 provide suggestive evidence that in family networks with better information
consumption allocations are closer to what would be observed under perfect risk
sharing.
The results based on the quality of information about household income is even
stronger and more precise. It indicates that households with high in-degree centrality
are less sensitive to indiosyncratic shocks. It also indicates that they experience,
on avergage, slower consumption growth. On the other hand, the sensitivity of
individual household to idiosyncratic shocks does not seem to be affected by out-degree
centrality. The next step to this analysis is to consider models that can justify these
patterns.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the relationship between risk sharing within family
networks and the quality of the information within these networks. To this end we
have used a unique data set from Tanzania that has followed more than 700 family
networks over a period of nearly 20 years, even when some of their members migrated
outside of the original villages that they we living when the data collection was
started.
A unique feature of these data is that they ask each individual household within
a network information about their own wealth and assets held by the other members.
We use this information to construct measures of the quality of the information flows
between any two member households of the family network. We show that our method
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is consistent with what one would expect: households that are geographically closer
to each other or that talk to each other often have better information about each other.
To the best of our knowledge, the construction of these measures is novel and has not
been used before. Moreover, we use the information quality measures we estimate to
construct weighted adjacency matrices for each of our network which are asymmetric
and value each link between two individual households in terms of the quality of the
information flows mong them.
We then relate the quality of information we derive to the degree of risk sharing,
as measured by some standard regressions of the type proposed by Townsend (1994)
relating household consumption changes to household shocks, after controlling for
family network level shocks. We show that in networks with better information quality,
consumption allocations are closer to what one would observe under perfect risk
sharing. More precisely, we show that households that more is known about in the
network, are less sensitive to idiosyncratic shocks.
The quality of information between two households in a network is linked to
specific choices individual make and in particular to migration. Individual households
that are induced, by economic opportunities and other motives, to live far from other
members of the network, effectively affect the quality of information. We argue,
however, that as we consider the sensitivity of individual consumption to shocks
experienced after the structure of the network and therefore the quality of information
within it is established, this issue does not bias our results about the extent of risk
sharing.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that relates information quality
to risk sharing. Although the results are very intuitive, the next step, that is being
taken in Attanasio et al. (2020, in progress), is to consider risk sharing arrangements
with information frictions and relate the consumption allocations that arise from such
arrangements to the properties of the network that can be derived from the information
data that we have.
Finally, we conclude with a note of caution. Our study does not characterise
risk sharing fully. We only consider, partly because of the nature of the data we
have, risk sharing within a specific network and ignore possible other mechanisms
that could involve individuals outside the family network or other arrangements.
Furthermore, our focus is on ex-post risk-coping strategies. Quality of information
within the network may also affect ex-ante behaviour. We do not see evidence
of systematic differences in frequency with which good and bad shocks occur in
households belonging to networks with better and worse information. However, this
question warrants further investigation. We also do not consider other frictions,
such as the imperfect enforceability of contracts. Neither do we consider the
process of network formation and specific processes (such as migration) that
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